Eight
Lectures On Yoga - Index
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 1
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 2
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 3
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 4
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 5
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 6
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 7
Eight
Lectures On Yoga Pt 8
Mr. Chairman, Your Royal Highness,
Your Grace, my lords, ladies and gentlemen.
Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the
Law.
In my last lecture I led you into the quag of delusion;
I smothered you in the mire of delusion; I brought you to
thirst in the desert of delusion; I left you wandering in
the jungle of delusion, a prey to all the monsters which
are thoughts. It came into my mind that it was up to me to
do something about it.
We have constantly been discussing mysterious entities as
if we knew something about them, and this (on examination)
always turned out not to be the case.
2. Knowledge itself is impossible, because if we take the
simplest proposition of knowledge, S is P, we must attach
some meaning to S and P, if our statement is to be intelligible.
(I say nothing as to whether it is true!) And this involves
definition. Now the original proposition of identity, A =
A, tells us nothing at all, unless the second A gives us
further information about the first A. We shall therefore
say that A is BC. Instead of one unknown we have two unknowns;
we have to define B as DE, C as FG. Now we have four unknowns,
and very soon we have used up the alphabet. When we come
to define Z, we have to go back and use one of the other
letters, so that all our arguments are arguments in a circle.
3. Any statement which we make is demonstrably meaningless.
And yet we do mean something when we say that a cat has
four legs. And we all know what we mean when we say so. We
give our assent to, or withhold it from, the proposition
on the grounds of our experience. But that experience is
not intellectual, as above demonstrated. It is a matter of
immediate intuition. We cannot have any warrant for that
intuition, but at the same time any intellectual argument
which upsets it does not in the faintest degree shake our
conviction.
4. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the instrument
of mind is not intellectual, not rational. Logic is merely
destructive, a self-destructive toy. The toy, however, is
in some ways also instructive, even though the results of
its use will not bear examination. So we make a by-law that
the particular sorites which annihilate logic are out of
bounds, and we go on reasoning within arbitrarily appointed
limits. It is subject to these conditions that we may proceed
to examine the nature of our fundamental ideas; and this
is necessary, because since we began to consider the nature
of the results of meditation, our conceptions of the backgrounds
of thought are decided in quite a different manner; not by
intellectual analysis, which, as we have seen, carries no
conviction, but by illumination, which does carry conviction.
Let us, therefore, proceed to examine the elements of our
normal thinking.
5. I need hardly recapitulate the mathematical theorem which
you all doubtless laid to heart when you were criticising
Einstein's theory of relatively. I only want to recall to
your minds the simplest element of that theorem; the fact
that in order to describe anything at all, you must have
four measurements. It must be so far east or west, so far
north or south, so far up or down, from a standard point,
and it must be after or before a standard moment. There are
three dimensions of space and one of time.
6. Now what do we mean by space? Henri Poincare, one of
the greatest mathematicians of the last generation, thought
that the idea of space was invented by a lunatic, in a fantastic
(and evidently senseless and aimless) endeavour to explain
to himself his experience of his muscular movements. Long
before that, Kant had told us that space was subjective,
a necessary condition of thinking; and while every one must
agree with this, it is obvious that it does not tell us much
about it.
7. Now let us look into our minds and see what idea, if
any, we can form about space. Space is evidently a continuum.
There cannot be any difference between any parts of it because
it is wholly where. It is pure background, the area
of possibilities, a condition of quality and so of all consciousness.
It is therefore in itself completely void. Is that right,
sir?
8. Now suppose we want to fulfil one of these possibilities.
The simplest thing we can take is a point, and we are told
that a point has neither parts nor magnitude, but only position.
But, as long as there is only one point, position means nothing.
No possibility has yet been created of any positive statement.
We will therefore take two points, and from these we get
the idea of a line. Our Euclid tells us that a line has length
but no breadth. But, as long as there are only two points,
length itself means nothing; or, at the most, it means separateness.
All we can say about two points is that there are two of
them.
9. Now we take a third point, and at last we come to a more
positive idea. In the first place, we have a plane surface,
though that in itself still means nothing, in the same way
as length means nothing when there are only two points there.
But the introduction of the third point has given a meaning
to our idea of length. We can say that the line AB is longer
than the line BC, and we can also introduce the idea of an
angle.
10. A fourth point, provided that it is not in the original
plane, gives us the idea of a solid body. But, as before,
it tells us nothing about the solid body as such, because
there is no other solid body with which to compare it. We
find also that it is not really a solid body at all as it
stands, because it is merely an instantaneous kind of illusion.
We cannot observe, or even imagine, anything, unless we have
time for the purpose.
11. What, then is time? It is a phantasm, exactly as tenuous
as space, but the possibilities of differentiation between
one thing and another can only occur in one way instead of
in three different ways. We compare two phenomena in time
by the idea of sequence.
12. Now it will be perfectly clear to all of you that this
is all nonsense. In order to conceive the simplest possible
object, we have to keep on inventing ideas, which even in
the proud moment of invention are seen to be unreal. How
are we to get away from the world of phantasmagoria to the
common universe of sense? We shall require quite a lot more
acts of imagination. We have got to endow our mathematical
conceptions with three ideas which Hindu philosophers call
Sat, Chit and Ananda, which are usually translated Being,
Knowledge and Bliss. This really means: Sat, the tendency
to conceive of an object as real; Chit, the tendency to pretend
that it is an object of knowledge; and Ananda, the tendency
to imagine that we are affected by it.
13. It is only after we have endowed the object with these
dozen imaginary properties, each of which, besides being
a complete illusion, is an absurd, irrational, and self-contradictory
notion, that we arrive at even the simplest object of experience.
And this object must, of course, be constantly multiplied.
Otherwise our experience would be confined to a single object
incapable of description.
14. We have also got to attribute to ourselves a sort of
divine power over our nightmare creation, so that we can
compare the different objects of our experience in all sorts
of different manners. Incidentally, this last operation of
multiplying the objects stands evidently invalid, because
(after all) what we began with was absolutely Nothingness.
Out of this we have somehow managed to obtain, not merely
one, but many; but, for all that, our process has followed
the necessary operation of our intellectual machine. Since
that machine is the only machine that we possess, our arguments
must be valid in some sense or other conformable with the
nature of this machine. What machine? That is a perfectly
real object. It contains innumerable parts, powers and faculties.
And they are as much a nightmare as the external universe
which it has created. Gad, sir, Patanjali is right!
15. Now how do we get over this difficulty of something
coming from Nothing? Only by enquiring what we mean by Nothing.
We shall find that this idea is totally inconceivable to
the normal mind. For if Nothing is to be Nothing, it must
be Nothing in every possible way. (Of course, each of these
ways is itself an imaginary something, and there are Aleph-Zero-a
transfinite number-of them.) If, for example, we say that
Nothing is a square triangle, we have had to invent a square
triangle in order to say it. But take a more homely instance.
We know what we mean by saying 'There are cats in the room.'
We know what we mean when we say 'No cats are in the room.'
But if we say 'No cats are not in the room,'
we evidently mean that some cats are in
the room. This remark is not intended to be a reflection
upon this distinguished audience.
16. So then, if Nothing is to be really the absolute Nothing,
we mean that Nothing does not enter into the category of
existence. To say that absolute Nothing exists is equivalent
to saying that everything exists which exists, and the great
Hebrew sages of old time noted this fact by giving it the
title of the supreme idea of reality (behind their tribal
God, Jehovah, who, as we have previously shown, is merely
the Yoga of the 4 Elements, even at his highest, -- the Demiourgos)
Eheieh-Asher-Eheieh, -- I am that I am.
17. If there is any sense in any of this at all, we may
expect to find an almost identical system of thought all
over the world. There is nothing exclusively Hebrew about
this theogony. We find, for example, in the teachings of
Zoroaster and the neo-Platonists very similar ideas. We have
a Pleroma, the void, a background of all possibilities, and
this is filled by a supreme Light-God, from whom drive in
turn the seven Archons, who correspond closely to the seven
planetary deities, Aratron, Bethor, Phaleg and the rest.
These in their turn constitute a Demiurge in order to create
matter; and this Demiurge is Jehovah. Not far different are
the ideas both of the classical Greeks and the neo-Platonists.
The differences in the terminology, when examined, appear
as not much more than the differences of local convenience
in thinking. But all these go back to the still older cosmogony
of the ancient Egyptians, where we have Nuit, Space, Hadit,
the point of view; these experience congress, and so produce
Heru-Ra-Ha, who combines the ideas of Ra-Hoor-Khuit and Hoor-paar-Kraat.
These are the same twin Vau and He' final which we know.
Here is evidently the origin of the system of the Tree of
Life.
18. We have arrived at this system by purely intellectual
examination, and it is open to criticism; but the point I
wish to bring to your notice tonight is that it corresponds
closely to one of the great states of mind which reflect
the experience of Samadhi.
There is a vision of peculiar character which has been of
cardinal importance in my interior life, and to which constant
reference is made in my Magical Diaries. So far as I know,
there is no extant description of this vision anywhere, and
I was surprised on looking through my records to find that
I had given no clear account of it myself. The reason apparently
is that it is so necessary a part of myself that I unconsciously
assume it to be a matter of common knowledge, just as one
assumes that everyone knows that one possesses a pair of
lungs, and therefore abstains from mentioning the fact directly,
although perhaps alluding to the matter often enough.
It appears very essential to describe this vision as well
as possible, considering the difficulty of langauge, and
the fact that the phenomena involved logical contradictions,
the conditions of consciousness being other than those obtaining
normally.
The vision developed gradually. It was repeated on so many
occasions that I am unable to say at what period it may be
called complete. The beginning, however, is clear enough
in my memory.
19. I was on a Great Magical Retirement in a cottage overlooking
Lake Pasquaney in New Hampshire. I lost consciousness of
everything but an universal space in which were innumerable
bright points, and I realised that this was a physical representation
of the universe, in what I may call its essential structure.
I exclaimed:
'Nothingness, with twinkles!' I concentrated upon this vision,
with the result that the void space which had been the principal
element of it diminished in importance. Space appeared to
be ablaze, yet the radiant points were not confused, and
I thereupon completed my sentence with the exclamation: 'But what Twinkles!'
20. The next stage of this vision led to an identification
of the blazing points with the stars of the firmament, with
ideas, souls, etc. I perceived also that each star was connected
by a ray of light with each other star. In the world of ideas,
each thought possessed a necessary relation with each other
thought; each such relation is of course a thought in itself;
each such ray is itself a star. It is here that logical difficulty
first presents itself. The seer has a direct perception of
infinite series. Logically, therefore, it would appear as
if the entire space must be filled up with a homogeneous
blaze of light. This is not, however, the case. The space
is completely full, yet the monads which fill it are perfectly
distinct. The ordinary reader might well exclaim that such
statements exhibit symptoms of mental confusion. The subject
demands more than cursory examination. I can do no more than
refer the critic to Bertrand Russell's 'Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy', where the above position is thoroughly justified,
as also certain positions which follow.
I want you to note in particular the astonishing final identification
of this cosmic experience with the nervous system as described
by the anatomist.
21. At this point we may well be led to consider once more
what we call the objective universe, and what we call our
subjective experience. What is Nature? Immanuel Kant, who
founded an epoch-making system of subjective idealism, is
perhaps the first philosopher to demonstrate clearly that
space, time, causality (in short, all conditions of existence)
are really no more than conditions of thought. I have tried
to put it more simply by defining all possible predicates
as so many dimensions. To describe an object properly it
is not sufficient to determine its position in the space-time
continuum of four dimensions, but we must enquire how it
stands in all the categories and scales, its values in all
'kinds' of possibility. What do we know about it in respect
of its greenness, its hardness, its mobility, and so on?
And then we find out that what we imagine to be the description
of the object is in reality nothing of the sort.
22. All that we recorded is the behaviour of our instruments.
What did our telescopes, spectroscopes, and balances tell
us? And these again are dependent upon the behaviour of our
senses; for the reality of our instruments, of our organs
of sense, is just as much in need of description and demonstration
as are the most remote phenomena. And we find ourselves forced
to the conclusion that anything we perceive is only perceived
by us as such 'because of our tendency so to perceive it.'
And we shall find that in the fourth stage of the great Buddhist
practice, Mahasatipatthana, we become directly and immediately
aware of this fact instead of digging it out of the holts
of these interminable sorites which badger us! Kant himself
put it, after his fashion: 'The laws of nature are the laws
of our own minds.' Why? It is not the contents of the mind
itself that we can cognise, but only its structure. But Kant
has not gone to this length. He would have been extremely
shocked if it had ever struck him that the final term in
his sorites was 'Reason itself is the only reality.' On further
examination, even this ultimate truth turns out to be meaningless.
It is like the well known circular definition of an obscene
book, which is: one that arouses certain ideas in the mind
of the kind of person in whom such ideas are excited by that
kind of book.
23. I notice that my excellent chairman is endeavouring
to stifle a yawn and to convert it into a smile, and he will
forgive me for saying that I find the effect somewhat sinister.
But he has every right to be supercilious about it. These
are indeed 'old, fond paradoxes to amuse wives in ale-houses.'
Since philosophy began, it has always been a favourite game
to prove your axioms absurd.
You will all naturally be very annoyed with me for indulging
in these fatuous pastimes, especially as I started out with
a pledge that I would deal with these subjcts from the hard-headed
scientific point of view. Forgive me if I have toyed with
these shining gossamers of the thought-web! I have only been
trying to break it to you gently. I proceed to brush away
with a sweep of my lily-white hand all this tenuous, filmy
stuff, 'such stuff as dreams are made of.' We will get down
to modern science.
24. For general reading there is no better introduction
than 'The Bases of Modern Science', by my old and valued
friend the late J. W. N. Sullivan. I do not want to detain
you too long with quotations from this admirable book. I
would much rather you got it and read it yourself; you could
hardly make better use of your time. But let us spend a few
moments on his remarks about the question of geometry.
Our conceptions of space as a subjective entity has been
completely upset by the discovery that the equations of Newton
based on Euclidean Geometry are inadequate to explain the
phenomena of gravitation. It is instinctive to us to think
of a straight line; it is somehow axiomatic. But we learn
that this does not exist in the objective universe. We have
to use another geometry, Riemann's Geometry, which is one
of the curved geometries. (There are, of course, as many
systems of geometry as there are absurd axioms to build them
on. Three lines make one ellipse: any nonsense you like:
you can proceed to construct a geometry which is correct
so long as it is coherent. And there is nothing right or
wrong about the result: the only question is: which is the
most convenient system for the purpose of describing phenomena?
We found the idea of Gravitation awkward: we went to Riemann.)
This means that the phenomena are not taking place against
a background of a flat surface; the surface itself is curved.
What we have thought of as a straight line does not exist
at all. And this is almost impossible to conceive; at least
it is quite impossible for myself to visualise. The nearest
one gets to it is by trying to imagine that you are a reflection
on a polished door-knob.
25. I feel almost ashamed of the world that I have to tell
you that in the year 1900, four years before the appearance
of Einstein's world-shaking paper, I described space as 'finite
yet boundless,' which is exactly the description in general
terms that he gave in more mathematical detail.(*) You
will see at once that these three words do describe a curved
geometry; a sphere, for instance, is a finite object, yet
you can go over the surface in any direction without ever
coming to an end.
I said above that Riemann's Geometry was not quite sufficient
to explain the phenomena of nature. We have to postulate
different kinds of curvature in different parts of the continuum.
And even then we are not happy!
26. Now for a spot of Sullivan! 'The geometry is so general
that it admits of different degrees of curvature in different
parts of space-time. It is to this curvature that gravitational
effects are due. The curvature of space-time is most prominent,
therefore, around large masses, for here the gravitational
effects are most marked. If we take matter as fundamental,
we may say that it is the presence of matter that causes
the curvature of space-time. But there is a different school
of thought that regards matter as due to the curvature of
space-time. That is, we assume as fundamental a space-time
continuum manifest to our senses as what we call matter.
Both points of view have strong arguments to recommend them.
But, whether or not matter may be derived from the geometrical
peculiarities of the space-time continuum, we may take it
as an established scientific fact that gravitation has been
so derived. This is obviously a very great achievement, but
it leaves quite untouched another great class of phenomena,
namely, electro-magnetic phenomena. In this space-time continuum
of Einstein's the electro-magnetic forces appear as entirely
alien. Gravitation has been absorbed, as it were, into Riemannian
geometry, and the notion of force, so far as gravitational
phenomena are concerned, has been abolished. But the electro-magnetic
forces still flourish undisturbed. There is no hint that
they are manifestations of the geometrical peculiarities
of the space-time continuum. And it can be shown to be impossible
to relate them to anything in Riemann's Geometry. Gravitation
can be shown to correspond to certain geometrical peculiarities
of a Riemannian space-time. But the electro-magnetic forces
lie completely outside this scheme.'
27. Here is the great quag into which mathematical physics
has led its addicts. Here we have two classes of phenomena,
all part of a unity of physics. Yet the equations which describe
and explain the one class are incompatible with those of
the other class! This is not a question of philosophy at
all, but a question of fact. It does not do to consider that
the universe is composed of particles. Such a hypothesis
underlies one class of phenomena, but it is nonsense when
applied to the electro-magnetic equations, which insist upon
our abandoning the idea of particles for that of waves.
Here is another Welsh rabbit for supper!
'Einstein's finite universe is such that its radius is dependent
upon the amount of matter in it. Were more matter to be created,
the volume of the universe would increase. Were matter to
be annihilated, the volume of space would decrease. Without
matter, space would not exist. Thus the mere existence of
space, besides its metrical properties, depends upon the
existence of matter. With this conception it becomes possible
to regard all motion, including rotation, as purely relative.'
Where do we go from here, boys?
28. 'The present tendency of physics is towards describing
the universe in terms of mathematical relations between unimaginable
entities.'
We have got a long way from Lord Kelvin's too-often and
too-unfairly quoted statement that he could not imagine anything
of which he could not construct a mechanical model. The Victorians
were really a little inclined to echo Dr. Johnson's gross
imbecile stamp on the ground when the ideas of Bishop Berkeley
penetrated to the superficial strata of the drink-sodden
grey cells of that beef-witted brute.
29. Now, look you, I ask you to reflect upon the trouble
we have taken to calculate the distance of the fixed stars,
and hear Professor G. N. Lewis, who 'suggests that two atoms
connected by a light ray may be regarded as in actual physical
contact. The interval between two ends of a light-ray
is, on the theory of relativity, zero, and Professor Lewis
suggests that this fact should be taken seriously. On this
theory, light is not propagated at all. This idea is in conformity
with the principle that none but observable factors should
be used in constructing a scientific theory, for we can certainly
never observe the passage of light in empty space. We are
only aware of light when it encouters matter. Light which
never encounters matter is purely hypothetical. If we do
not make that hypothesis, then there is no empty space. On
Professor Lewis's theory, when we observe a distant star,
our eye as truly makes physical contact with that star as
our finger makes contact with a table when we press it.'
30. And did not all of you think that my arguments were
arguments in a circle? I certainly hope you did, for I was
at the greatest pains to tell you so. But it is not a question
of argument in Mr. Sullivan's book; it is a question of facts.
He was talking about human values. He was asking whether
science could possibly be cognizant of them. Here he comes,
the great commander! Cheer, my comrades, cheer!
'But although consistent materialists were probably always
rare, the humanistically important fact remained that science
did not find it necessary to include values in its description
of the universe. For it appeared that science, in spite of
this omission, formed a closed system. If values form an
integral part of reality, it seems strange that science should
be able to give a consistent description of phenomena which
ignores them.
'At the present time, this difficulty is being met in two
ways.
On the one hand, it is pointed out that science remains
within its own domain by the device of cyclic definition,
that is to say, the abstractions with which it begins are
all it ever talks about. It makes no fresh contacts with
reality, and therefore never encounters any possibly disturbing
factors. This point of view is derived from the theory of
relativity, particularly from the form of presentation adopted
by Eddington. This theory forms a closed circle. The primary
terms of the theory, point-events, potentials, matter (etc.-there
are ten of them), lie at various points on the circumference
of the circle. We may start at any point and go round the
circle, that is, from any one of these terms we can deduce
the others. The primary entities of the theory are defined
in terms of one another. In the course of this exercise we
derive the laws of Nature studied in physics. At a certain
point in the chain of deductions, at matter, for
example, we judge that we are talking about something which
is an objective concrete embodiment of our abstractions.
But matter, as it occurs in physics, is no more than a particular
set of abstractions, and our subsequent reasoning is concerned
only with these abstractions. Such other characteristics
as the objective reality may possess never enter our scheme.
But the set of abstractions called matter in relativity theory
do not seem to be adequate to the whole of our scientific
knowledge of matter. There remain quantum phenomena.'
Ah!
'So we leave her, so we leave her,
Far from where her swarthy kindred roam-kindred roam
In the Scarlet Fever, Scarlet Fever,
Scarlet Fever Convalescent Home.'
31. So now, no less than that chivalrous gentleman, His
Grace, the Most Reverend the Archbishop of Canterbury, who
in a recent broadcast confounded for ever all those infidels
who had presumed to doubt the possibility of devils entering
into swine, we have met the dragon science and conquered.
We have seen that, however we attack the problem of mind,
whether from the customary spiritual standpoint, or from
the opposite corner of materialism, the result is just the
same.
One last quotation from Mr. Sullivan. 'The universe may
ultimately prove to be irrational. The scientific adventure
may have to be given up.'
But that is all he knows about science, bless his
little heart! We do not give up. 'You lied, d'Ormea, I do
not repent!' The results of experiment are still valid for
experience, and the fact that the universe turns out on enquiry
to be unintelligible only serves to fortify our ingrained
conviction that experience itself is reality.
32. We may then ask ourselves whether it is not possible
to obtain experience of a higher order, to discover and develop
the faculty of mind which can transcend analysis, stable
against all thought by virtue of its own self-evident assurance.
In the language of the Great White Brotherhood (whom I am
here to represent) you cross the abyss. 'Leave the poor old
stranded wreck'-Ruach- 'and pull for the shore' of Neschamah.
For above the abyss, it is said, as you will see if you study
the Supplement of the fifth number of the First Volume of
'The Equinox', an idea is only true in so far as it contains
its contradictory in itself.
33. It is such states of mind as this which constitute the
really important results of Samyama, and these results are
not to be destroyed by philosophical speculation, because
they are not susceptible of analysis, because they have no
component parts, because they exist by virtue of their very
Unreason-'certum est quia ineptum!' They cannot be expressed,
for they are above knowledge. To some extent we can convey
our experience to others familiar with that experience to
a less degree by the aesthetic method. And this explains
why all the good work on Yoga-alchemy, magick and the rest-not
doctrinal but symbolic-the word of God to man, is given in
Poetry and Art.
In my next lecture I shall endeavour to go a little deeper
into the technique of obtaining these results, and also give
a more detailed account of the sort of thing that is likely
to occur in the course of the preliminary practices.
Love is the law, love under will.
*TANNHAUSER, written in Mexico, O.F., August,
1900. See also my BERASHITH, written in Delhi, April, 1901.
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